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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 We once again confront the tension caused when a 
criminal defendant appears to be manipulating his right to 
counsel in order to delay his trial.  After relieving Ronald 
Goldberg's court-appointed attorney, the district court refused 
his request for a continuance in order to retain private counsel.  
This forced Goldberg to stand trial without the assistance of 
counsel.  The district court concluded that by his manipulative 
conduct, Goldberg had "waived" or, more properly, "forfeited" his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
 The question before us is whether the district court 
deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
We conclude that, although there are circumstances in which the 
dilatory tactics of a defendant can amount to a forfeiture of his 
right to counsel, the record here is insufficient to support such 
a forfeiture.  We further hold that the district court's failure 
to warn the defendant of the risks of self-representation 
precludes us from finding a valid "waiver by conduct."  We 
therefore will reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the 





 Goldberg was serving a sentence at Lewisburg 
Penitentiary for a previous conviction.  While serving that 
sentence he forged the signature of a magistrate-judge on a 
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document that purported to allow Goldberg unrestricted access to 
the prison's law library. Prison officials investigated the 
authenticity of the document and discovered the forgery.  
Goldberg was indicted for forging the signature of a judicial 
officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 505, and for making a 
materially false statement to a federal agency in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1001. 
 Exactly how Goldberg came to be represented by court-
appointed counsel is somewhat unclear.  At some point Goldberg 
was provided with a questionnaire concerning his financial 
ability to retain counsel.  It appears that the questionnaire was 
never completed.  Prior to his arraignment on the indictment, 
however, Bradley Lunsford was assigned to represent Goldberg 
through the Federal Defender's Office pursuant to the practice in 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania of providing prisoners with a 
court-appointed attorney.  The district court informed the 
parties that jury selection would commence on May 31, 1994. 
 Between these dates, Lunsford filed several motions on 
Goldberg's behalf.  He also attempted to visit Goldberg in 
prison. On that occasion Goldberg refused to see Lunsford after 
making him wait over two hours.  As a result they were unable to 
confer in person, although Lunsford and Goldberg thereafter did 
communicate by mail and telephone on several occasions. 
 On May 27, 1994, Goldberg filed on his own behalf a 
motion seeking a continuance in order to obtain new counsel or, 
in the alternative, to proceed "In Propia Persona" (sic).  He 
also gave notice of his intention to pursue an insanity defense.  
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In support of his request to remove Lunsford, Goldberg alleged 
that Lunsford: (1) disagreed with him on how to conduct the 
defense; (2) was not well versed in federal criminal procedure; 
(3) showed no interest in his case; and (4) had not met with him 
to discuss the case and failed to file motions that Goldberg 
demanded be filed. 
 The district court on that day entered an order denying 
the request to pursue an insanity defense as untimely under Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 12.2.  The court deferred consideration of Goldberg's 
request for a continuance, but noted that Goldberg's motion 
papers had failed to demonstrate good cause warranting a 
continuance.  The district court nevertheless advised Goldberg 
that he would be given an opportunity to state on the record his 
reasons for believing that Lunsford's performance was inadequate.  
If persuaded, the district court advised that it would relieve 
Lunsford, appoint new counsel, and reconsider whether to grant a 
continuance. Alternatively, if the district court was not 
satisfied that Lunsford should be relieved, it would deny 
Goldberg's motion and require him to choose between going to 
trial with Lunsford or proceeding pro se.  
 Immediately prior to the commencement of jury selection 
on May 31, 1994, the district court conducted an inquiry into 
Goldberg's allegations concerning Lunsford.  After hearing from 
both Goldberg and Lunsford, it concluded that Lunsford was 
providing adequate representation.  Given the choice of 
continuing to be represented by Lunsford or proceeding pro se, 
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Goldberg chose to remain with Lunsford.1  At this point, however, 
Goldberg revealed for the first time that he had the financial 
resources to retain private counsel, and that several attorneys 
had conferred with him at Lewisburg.  The district court advised 
Goldberg that if he could retain an attorney by the commencement 
of trial, it would reconsider the motion seeking a continuance. 
 Lunsford requested permission to withdraw, asserting 
that he did not have a proper attorney-client relationship with 
Goldberg.  As an example, he stated that Goldberg was 
"threatening me and demanding that I do certain things that I 
don't feel are prudent."  App. at  34.  The district court denied 
Lunsford's motion to withdraw and conducted jury selection with 
Lunsford representing Goldberg.  Following the selection of the 
jury, the parties and the jury were advised that the taking of 
testimony would commence between June 6 and June 13. 
 On June 2, 1994, the district court set June 13, 1994, 
as the first day for taking testimony.  The government also filed 
with the court a "Status Report" indicating that a simple check 
into Goldberg's visitation record at Lewisburg revealed several 
visits from three different attorneys over the past two months. 
                     
1According to the district court's opinion, the court did not 
allow defendant to proceed pro se because he failed to give a 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights.  See 
United States v. Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. 725, 727 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
While this would appear to suggest that Goldberg had wanted to 
proceed pro se and that the trial court was not satisfied that he 
was competent to do so, this is clearly at odds with the record 
(and the position taken in both briefs), indicating that 
defendant affirmatively chose to keep his appointed attorney when 
given the option of pro se representation. 
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 Four days later, Lunsford initiated a telephone 
conference between himself, the trial court and the government at 
which time he renewed his request to withdraw.  Lunsford related 
that Goldberg had asked him to file a motion to withdraw as 
counsel.  When Lunsford refused, noting the ruling of the 
district court on May 31, 1994, Goldberg allegedly threatened 
Lunsford's life.  According to Lunsford, Goldberg stated that he 
had ample financial means to carry out his death threat as well 
as to hire a new attorney. 
 Without ordering that Goldberg be produced to answer 
Lunsford's allegations or relate his position in the matter, the 
district court granted Lunsford's motion to withdraw.  The 
district court noted that June 13 was the first day for taking 
testimony and informed Goldberg that he would not receive another 
appointed attorney since Goldberg had the financial means to 
retain counsel. The district court warned Goldberg that "unless 
he retains an attorney who enters an appearance . . . in this 
case, the trial will proceed with the defendant representing 
himself."  Supp. App. at 63.  This order was delivered to 
Goldberg the day it was issued. 
 Goldberg appeared on June 13 for the first day of 
testimony.  One of the attorneys who visited him at Lewisburg 
also was present in court.  Noting that a private attorney had 
not entered an appearance, the district court asked Goldberg if 
he intended to represent himself.  Goldberg presented the court 
with a letter from an attorney indicating that the attorney would 
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undertake to represent Goldberg, but only if a retainer was paid 
within forty-five days. 
 Referring to the letter from the attorney, Goldberg 
requested that the district court grant a continuance so that he 
could liquidate various assets, which would enable him to pay the 
retainer. The government opposed the application.  Goldberg 
continued to assert his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  He 
related that he had done everything in his power to retain 
counsel in the short time available, and was incapable of trying 
a criminal case. 
 The district court denied Goldberg's request for a 
continuance.  It observed that Goldberg had the financial ability 
to hire an attorney since the commencement of the case in April 
and failed to do so.  The district court commented: "The Court 
finds that you have manipulated the judicial system for your own 
benefit, and the Court will not grant the continuance.  The Court 
finds that by your conduct you have waived the right to proceed 
with counsel at this trial, and the Court simply will not 
tolerate that behavior."  App. at 91. 
 The district court advised Goldberg about how to 
comport himself before the jury, and the manner in which it would 
answer any questions concerning the correct procedure to be 
followed.  The government suggested that the attorney who had 
accompanied Goldberg to court be designated as stand-by counsel.  
Goldberg responded that stand-by counsel was not sufficient to 
satisfy his Sixth Amendment rights and that "I'm not making a 
valid waiver of my Sixth Amendment, Your Honor."  App. at 94.  
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The district court responded, "No, and I'm not engaging in a 
colloquy with you with respect to that either.  I'm determining 
that your actions have waived counsel, and that that was a 
knowing and voluntarily intentional act."  Id.  Goldberg again 
objected.  He noted that the proposed stand-by counsel was not 
admitted to practice before the district court.  Goldberg 
reiterated that, even if a defendant has waived his right to 
counsel, "it does not prohibit a defendant in a criminal case 
from reasserting his Sixth Amendment right, and in no way at all 
am I waiving my Sixth Amendment right to counsel." App. at 95. 
 Goldberg requested that the district court order 
Lunsford to return the case file to him, as it contained 
documents relevant to his defense.  Following the morning 
session, Lunsford appeared in court and turned the file over to 
Goldberg.  At this point, the district court sua sponte swore in 
Lunsford as a witness (out of the presence of the jury).  For the 
first time it elicited sworn testimony from Lunsford concerning 
the events that had given rise to his earlier application to 
withdraw as counsel for Goldberg, which the district court 
already had granted during the June 6 telephone conference to 
which Goldberg was not party. 
 The trial went forward with Goldberg conducting his own 
defense.  He was convicted on both counts of the indictment.  The 
district court sentenced Goldberg to two, concurrent terms of 
imprisonment of twenty-four months, to run consecutively to 
sentences he was already serving. 
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 The district court issued an opinion explaining why it 
had required Goldberg to proceed pro se.  United States v. 
Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. 725, 727 (M.D. Pa. 1994).  It quoted at 
length from its prior decision, United States v. Jennings, 855 F. 
Supp. 1427, 1441-43 (M.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd 61 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 
1995) (table), where it had found that the defendant had waived 
his right to counsel by punching his court-appointed attorney.  
The district court also concluded that Goldberg had not 
demonstrated good cause for his application on May 27, 1994, to 
substitute counsel.  Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. at 730-32.  Turning 
to its decision requiring Goldberg to represent himself, the 
district court relied on its Jennings decision.  It explained 
that threatening one's attorney with physical violence like the 
actual use of force is tantamount to a "waiver" of the right to 
counsel. The district court further held that its decision to 
relieve Lunsford was "in furtherance of the orderly and effective 
administration of justice," and that the decision was proper 
where Goldberg was "manipulat[ing] the right to counsel in order 





 The district court had original jurisdiction over this 
criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction to review a final judgment of conviction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Goldberg presses two principal claims of error on 
appeal.2  First, he challenges the district court's May 31, 1994, 
order forcing him to keep Lunsford essentially against his will. 
We review that decision for abuse of discretion.  McMahon v. 
Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Welty, 
674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982).  Second, Goldberg claims that the 
district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel when, on the first day of testimony, it 
forced him to proceed pro se.  We review de novo Goldberg's Sixth 
Amendment claim since it is tantamount to a claim of an 
ineffective waiver of a constitutional right.  United States v. 
Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1017, 110 S. Ct. 1321 (1990).  Our review is plenary 
notwithstanding the fact that the district court found a knowing 
and intelligent waiver and supported its legal conclusion with 
findings of fact.  Determining the requirements that must be 
satisfied in order to find an effective waiver of a 





                     
2Because of our holding, we decline to reach Goldberg's 
additional claim that the district court's decision to relieve 
Lunsford during an ex parte proceeding deprived him of procedural 
due process.  We also need not reach Goldberg's claim that the 
district court improperly directed a verdict on the element of 
materiality in 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  See United States v. Gaudin, 
___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).  We recognize, however, 
that on remand the district court will be required to submit the 
issue of materiality to the jury in accordance with the dictates 
of Supreme Court's intervening decision in Gaudin. 
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 Goldberg first claims that the district court abused 
its discretion when, on May 31, it denied his May 27 request for 
a continuance so that he could retain a new attorney.  We 
understand Goldberg's claim as alleging a Sixth Amendment 
violation arising from the fact that he was represented for a 
period of time by an attorney with whom he was dissatisfied. 
  A. 
 The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."   U.S. Const. amend VI. 
Because it is essential to fair adjudication, see Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932), the right to counsel 
has long been considered "fundamental."  Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (right to counsel so 
fundamental that it is binding on the states through the doctrine 
of incorporation); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 58 S. 
Ct. 1019, 1022 (1938) ("This is one of the safeguards . . . 
deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and 
liberty.");  see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & 
n.8, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28 & n.8 (1967) (right to counsel is so 
fundamental to our adversarial system that its deprivation can 
never be deemed harmless). 
B. 
 On several prior occasions we have confronted 
situations where a defendant moved on the eve of trial for a 
continuance to retain substitute counsel.  Because the denial of 
such a motion forces a defendant to choose between representation 
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by an attorney with whom he is dissatisfied and proceeding pro 
se, we set forth a two-part inquiry in Welty, 674 F.2d at 187, to 
balance a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel with a 
district court's legitimate interest in guarding against 
manipulation and delay.  The first inquiry requires a district 
court to determine whether good cause exists for granting the 
requested continuance. The second requires the district court to 
engage in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that a defendant 
who chooses to represent himself is making a knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  It 
is Welty's first inquiry that applies here. 
 In considering a last-minute request for substitution 
of counsel and a continuance, we require district courts to 
inquire as to the reason for the request.  As we noted in Welty, 
the request need not be granted unless "good cause" is shown for 
the defendant's dissatisfaction with his current attorney.  We 
defined good cause as a conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with 
the attorney. Id. at 188; see also McMahon, 821 F.2d at 942. 
 In several decisions following Welty, we have 
acknowledged that there are countervailing governmental 
interests. For instance, in United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 
72 (3d Cir. 1991), we noted that the district court should 
consider factors such as the efficient administration of criminal 
justice; the accused's rights, including the opportunity to 
prepare a defense; and the rights of other defendants awaiting 
trial who may be prejudiced by a continuance.  Id. at 78.  
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Similarly, in United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 
1988), we observed that a court has discretion to deny a request 
for a continuance if made in bad faith, for purposes of delay or 
to subvert judicial proceedings.  Id. at 819.  But "a rigid 
insistence on expedition in the face of a justifiable request for 
delay can amount to a constitutional violation."  United States 
v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1986).  These factors are 
relevant to the "good cause" analysis under Welty. 
 If the district court denies the request to substitute 
counsel and the defendant decides to proceed with unwanted 
counsel, we will not find a Sixth Amendment violation unless the 
district court's "good cause" determination was clearly erroneous 
or the district court made no inquiry into the reason for the 
defendant's request to substitute counsel.  See McMahon, 821 F.2d 
at 944 (reversal warranted where district court relieved 
defendant's appointed attorney without inquiring into reason for 
withdrawal). 
C. 
 We reject Goldberg's claim that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his May 27, 1994, "emergency 
motion" to relieve counsel and for a continuance.  First, we note 
that the district court properly complied with Welty by 
conducting an inquiry into the reasons for Goldberg's 
dissatisfaction with Lunsford.  See Welty, 674 F.2d at 187; see 
also McMahon, 821 F.2d at 942.  After hearing from both Goldberg 
and Lunsford, the district court found that Goldberg's 
disagreement with Lunsford amounted to a difference over 
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strategy.  Specifically, Goldberg complained that Lunsford had 
not filed a host of motions that Goldberg insisted be filed.  
Analyzing the motions, the district court concluded (although 
after the fact) that they were meritless, if not frivolous.  
Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. at 730-32.  Finding that Lunsford's 
refusal to file the motions did not amount to good cause, the 
district court found no basis for substituting counsel and 
delaying the trial. 
 We conclude that the findings of the district court are 
not clearly erroneous.  Moreover, to the extent that Goldberg 
complains that the reasons supporting the district court's 
decision were not issued until some three weeks later, we 
nevertheless find that the record of the May 27 and May 31 
proceedings amply support the district court's good cause 
determination.  Accordingly, because we find no abuse of 
discretion in the denial of the continuance, any Sixth Amendment 
claim Goldberg alleges arising from his representation by an 





 Goldberg asserts, however, that even if the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a 
continuance, it nevertheless violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel when it forced him to proceed pro se.  Goldberg 
challenges the district court's conclusion that he "waived" his 
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right to counsel through dilatory conduct.  While recognizing 
that in certain circumstances a court may find a waiver by 
conduct, in this case Goldberg claims that his conduct was not so 
dilatory as to warrant the drastic remedy of forcing him to 
defend himself. 
 The government concedes that the district court did not 
engage in the sort of inquiry required by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 
(1975), and our  decision in Welty.  These cases require an on-
the-record colloquy evincing both a knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and an explanation by 
the district court of the risks of self-representation.  As a 
suitable alternative to the colloquy required by Faretta and 
Welty, the government contends that there are certain factual 
scenarios in which "literally actions speak louder than words," 
Government's Br. at 40, and deliberate abusive conduct can result 
in a "waiver" of the right to counsel. 
A. 
 Before turning to the merits of the government's 
contention, we note an important distinction between the ideas of 
"waiver" and "forfeiture," and a hybrid of those two concepts,  
"waiver by conduct."  Both parties appear to have confused those 
issues, as have a number of courts that have addressed the effect 
of a defendant's dilatory tactics on the right to counsel.  
Because the resolution of that confusion has important 
implications for the Sixth Amendment, we begin with a discussion 
of "waiver," "forfeiture," and "waiver by conduct" 
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1. 
 A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment 
of a known right.  Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S. Ct. at 1023; 
see generally LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 11.3(c), at 
546 n.4. (2d ed. 1992).  The most commonly understood method of 
"waiving" a constitutional right is by an affirmative, verbal 
request.  Typical of such waivers under the Sixth Amendment are 
requests to proceed pro se and requests to plead guilty.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that a waiver of the right to 
counsel must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.  Johnson, 304 
U.S. at 464-65, 58 S. Ct. at 1023.  The High Court has emphasized 
the importance of an affirmative, on-the-record waiver, noting 
that it "indulge[s] every reasonable presumption against waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights."  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625, 633 , 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1986) (quoting Johnson, 
304 U.S. at 464, 58 S. Ct. at 1023). 
 Where a defendant requests permission to proceed pro 
se, Faretta requires trial courts to ensure that the defendant is 
aware of the risks of proceeding pro se as a constitutional 
prerequisite to a valid waiver of the right to counsel.  Faretta, 
422 U.S. at 806, 95 S. Ct. at 2525.  Moreover, our decision in 
Welty mandates that trial courts conduct a Faretta-type inquiry 
before permitting a defendant who asks to represent himself to do 
so: 
The court . . . has the responsibility of 
ensuring that any choice of self-
representation is made knowing and 
intelligently, with an awareness of the 
dangers and disadvantages inherent in 
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defending oneself. . . . In order to ensure 
that a defendant truly appreciates the 
"dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation," the district court should 
advise him in unequivocal terms both of the 
technical problems he may encounter in acting 
as his own attorney and of the risks he takes 
if his defense efforts are unsuccessful. . . 
. [A] defendant's waiver of counsel can be 
deemed effective only where the district 
court judge has made a searching inquiry 
sufficient to satisfy him that the 
defendant's waiver was understanding and 
voluntary. 
 
Welty, 674 F.2d at 188-89; see also United States v. Salemo, Nos. 
94-1361 & 94-1438, 1995 WL 440390 (3d Cir. July 26, 1995) 
(failure to warn of risks of self-representation render waiver of 
right to counsel invalid); Government of Virgin Islands v. James, 
934 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1991) (extensive colloquy between district 
court and defendant about perils of proceeding pro se sufficient 
to indicate that waiver of Sixth Amendment rights was knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent); McMahon, 821 F.2d at 934 (failure to 
provide warnings in accordance with Faretta and Welty requires 
reversal). 
2. 
 At the other end of the spectrum is the concept of 
"forfeiture."  Unlike waiver, which requires a knowing and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture results 
in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge 
thereof and irrespect__ 
